Abstract. We propose an optical security technique for image encryption using triple random-phase encoding (TRPE). In the encryption process, the original image is first double-random-phase encrypted. The obtained function is then multiplied by a third random-phase key in the output plane, to enhance the security level of the encryption process. This method reduces the vulnerability to certain attacks observed when using the conventional double random-phase encoding (DRPE). To provide the security enhancement of the proposed TRPE method, three attack cases are discussed: chosen-plaintext attacks, known-plaintext attacks, and chosenciphertext attacks. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method. Compared with conventional DRPE, the proposed encryption method can provide an effective alternative and has enhanced security features against the aforementioned attacks.
Introduction
In recent years, research on optical techniques for image encryption has gained a great potential owing to their high parallel processing speed and large storage memories. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] The main motivation for using optics for information security is that optical waveforms possess many complex degrees of freedom such as amplitude, phase, polarization, large bandwidth, nonlinear transformations, quantum properties of photons, and multiplexing that can be combined in many ways to make information encryption more secure and more difficult to attack. Several methods for optical image encryption have been proposed, such as those based on digital holography, 11, 12 virtual optics, 13 diffractive imaging, 14 ghost imaging, 15 ptychography, 16 interferometry, 17 polarization, 18, 19 and photon-counting. 20 In 1995, Refrégier and Javidi 21 proposed the "double random-phase encoding" (DRPE) scheme. The DRPE method has awakened the interest of many authors and it has been extended to different canonical transforms, which have been protected by several patents. Its principle consists in encrypting the input image into stationary white noise using two random-phase masks under a 4f optical processor. Recently, some experimental realization of the optical encryption-decryption has been achieved by researchers. [22] [23] [24] [25] The strength of any good encryption scheme resides in its behavior against unauthorized resources that wants to reveal some encrypted information. The security of the DRPE method has been thoroughly analyzed, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] showing that such a scheme is robust against the brute force attack, and vulnerable to known-plaintext attack (KPA), [28] [29] [30] [31] chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), [32] [33] [34] [35] chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), 36 and ciphertext-only attack. 37, 38, 24, 25 To enhance the security level of DRPE, multiple works have been proposed by several authors. Among them, Hennelly and Sheridan 42 proposed an encryption scheme based on an image scrambling technique that uses the jigsaw transform. The image security of scrambling techniques was studied in Ref. 43 . In particular, efficient hierarchical chaotic image encryption (HCIE) algorithm was analyzed in detail and they concluded that the security of the HCIE against ciphertext-only attack was overestimated. Cheng et al. 44 proposed a security-enhanced double random-phase-amplitude encryption (DRPAE) by adding an undercover amplitude-modulating operation in the Fourier domain. They also demonstrated that the DRPAE can resist the traditional (KPA). However, Kumar et al. 34 have demonstrated the vulnerability of the DRPAE scheme in front of a point spread function attack and He et al. 33 have proved that DRPAE is also vulnerable to a hybrid two-step attack, which utilizes a CPA followed by a KPA. Recently, Elshamy et al. 45 proposed an optical image encryption method based on chaotic baker map and DRPE, which consists of two layers. The first layer is a preprocessing chaotic baker map, which performs the randomization of the image pixels and the second layer is the conventional DRPE. However, Zhang et al. 35 have demonstrated the vulnerability to CPA of the encryption model using scrambling preprocessing before DRPE. Recently, several attack methods were proposed based on correlated imaging, 39 ptychographical imaging, 40 and wavefront shaping technique. 41 In this paper, we propose a triple random-phase encryption (TRPE) scheme. In particular, the proposed encryption system has a major purpose, which is to improve the security of optical encryption based on double random-phase encryption (DRPE) in a 4f system against different types of attacks. This means that the TRPE method here proposed shows appropriate security levels in front of different particular attacks, where the DRPE method fails. Note that the DRPE vulnerability in front of such specific attacks has been extensively proved by different authors in the literature.
Therefore, we want to emphasize that the extension of the DRPE by including a third random-phase encryption (TRPE method) is not only increasing the complexity of the system, in terms of more keys required to describe the system, but we want to show how specific attacks that already proved the DRPE vulnerability are not effective when attacking a system encrypted with the TRPE method. Thus, the applicability and the security levels of the method are improved when compared with the DRPE approach.
In addition, we want to note that the number of the phase random keys used in the encryption process (TRPE case) to increase the security levels does not correspond to a random guess, but it is the optimal key number in terms of applicability. This means that we have to look for the minimum number of keys providing enough security levels in front of the aforementioned attacks, but leading to an optical scheme that can be experimentally implemented. As logical, a large number of random keys will lead to a bulky setup of large complexity, which could not be practical for experimental proposes. However, in this paper we provide how by including just a third key, the resulting optical scheme can be still considered for an experimental implementation and the security levels are significantly improved.
The aforementioned security implement with a faceable optical scheme is provided thorough this paper by discussing three different attacks, where the DRPE proves to be vulnerable: CPA, KPA, and CCA. In all the analyzed cases, the security levels of the TRPE method are robust, where the DRPE fails.
Accordingly, this paper is arranged as follows: in Sec. 2, the theoretical method to design the proposed TRPE scheme is first described. In Sec. 3, we present simulation results to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method by working out an example of a grayscale image and binary image of size (256 × 256 pixels). We further test the strength of this encryption process against CPA, KPA, and CCA. Finally, the main conclusions of the work are given in Sec. 4.
Triple Random-Phase Encoding Basic Concepts
Let us briefly describe the concept of optical encryption system based on a DRPE scheme. Let fðx; yÞ be the input image to be encrypted, eðx; yÞ the encrypted image, and ϕ k 1 ðx; yÞ and ϕ k 2 ðu; vÞ two random noises that are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] , where ðx; yÞ and ðu; vÞ denote the spatial-and frequency-domain coordinates, respectively. First, the input image fðx; yÞ is multiplied by a phase-only mask k 1 ðx; yÞ ¼ exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞ. Then, the image resulting from this product is Fourier transformed to the spatial-frequency domain, where it is multiplied by a second random-phase mask k 2 ðu; vÞ ¼ exp½i2πϕ k 2 ðu; vÞ. Finally, another Fourier transformation is applied to the obtained image, this leading to the final encrypted image. This process is mathematically described by E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 1 ; 6 3 ; 1 9 1 e DRPE ðx; yÞ ¼ ffðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞg ⊗ hðx; yÞ;
where × denotes the dot product, ⊗ denotes convolution, and hðx; yÞ is a mask whose inverse Fourier transform (IFT) is equal to the k 2 ðu; vÞ mask, i.e., hðx; yÞ
We propose to add a third phase-only mask to the standard DRPE encryption scheme. Let us call this new encryption scheme as TRPE. In particular, we suggest multiplying the e DRPE ðx; yÞ image in Eq. (1) by the k 3 ðx; yÞ ¼ exp½i2πϕ k 3 ðx; yÞ phase-only mask, where ϕ k 3 ðx; yÞ is a random noise image limited within the range [0, 1] . Under this scenario, the encrypted image for the proposed TRPE scheme is expressed as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 2 ; 3 2 6 ; 7 0 8 e TRPE ðx; yÞ ¼ e DRPE ðx; yÞ × k 3 ðx; yÞ ¼ ðffðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞg ⊗ hðx; yÞÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 3 ðx; yÞ:
Due to symmetry considerations, the decryption process for the TRPE scheme is the reverse of the aforementioned encryption process. First, the encrypted image e TRPE ðx; yÞ is multiplied by the complex conjugate of the k 3 ðx; yÞ phase mask, i.e., by k Ã 3 ðx; yÞ (where the symbol * denotes complex conjugate). Then, the IFT of the product is taken. The result is then multiplied by the complex conjugate of the second phase-only mask k Ã 2 ðu; vÞ. Finally, the IFT is taken once again on the resulting image, this transformation leading to the product of the input image fðx; yÞ with the first mask used in the encryption process, k 1 ðx; yÞ. Therefore, this product is multiplied by k Ã 1 ðx; yÞ and the decrypted image f 0 ðx; yÞ is obtained. The decryption process is mathematically written as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 3 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 8 7
For the sake of clarity, the flowchart of the encryption and decryption processes is shown in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b), respectively.
Afterward, we also provide an example of a possible optical setup useful to implement the encryption process of the TRPE scheme (Fig. 2) . The optical scheme is based on the well-known 4f optical processor [see Fig. 1(a) ]. Note that the function eðx; yÞ in Fig. 1(a) is a complex-valued function. Therefore, the 4f processor has to be experimentally implemented on an interferometric-based setup, this allowing us to both obtain the amplitude and the phase of the encrypted image. To this aim, we propose an optical scheme inspired on the phase-shifting interferometric correlation setup implemented in Ref. 46 , which was based on a MachZehnder interferometer. In particular, a coherent monochromatic light source illuminates the optical system. The input beam is split in two light beams by means of a nonpolarizing beam-splitter (BS1). The reflected beam, let us call it reference beam (RB), is filtered and collimated using a spatial filter (PH1) properly combined with a convergent lens (L). Then, the RB is steered to the CCD, placed at the coordinate plane (X4; Y4), using the mirror 3 and a second beamsplitter (BS2). By contrast, the light transmitted on the BS1, let us call it as transmitted beam (TB), is filtered and collimated thanks to the combined action of the spatial filter (PH2) and the convergent lens (L1). Afterward, the 4f optical processor is assembled using the convergent lenses L2 and L3. The desired input object fðx; yÞ is multiplied by the phase-only mask k 1 ðx; yÞ at the (X1; Y1) plane. The phase function corresponding to the first key k 1 ðx; yÞ can be physically implemented by addressing the function to a spatial light modulator (SLM1) placed at the ðX1; Y1Þ plane. Next, the FT of the phase function addressed to the SLM1 ½fðx; yÞk 1 ðx; yÞ is obtained at convergent lens L2 focal lane, i.e., at the (X2; Y2) plane. At this plane, the SLM2 is placed, being responsible for generating the second-phase mask, k 2 ðu; vÞ. Afterward, the third phaseonly mask k 3 ðx; yÞ is generated at the (X3; Y3) plane thanks to the use of the SLM3. Note that the FT of the phase distribution at the (X2; Y2) plane is obtained at the (X3; Y3) plane because of the lens L3. Finally, a convergent lens L4 images the (X3; Y3) plane on the CCD camera. This beam interferes with the RB, and the corresponding interference pattern is registered at the CCD camera. Note that this final intensity distribution can be subsequently used for the decryption process.
Numerical Simulations and Analysis
Numerical simulations were carried out to analyze the performance of the proposed encryption scheme. As shown in Fig. 3 , the original images used for encryption in our case are: a multiple gray level-based image [Lena image, Fig. 3(a) ] and a two-gray level-based image [text "OPTICS," Fig. 3(e) ]. All the images used in this work present a size of 256 × 256 pixels. First, in Sec. 3.1, we test the suitability of the TRPE method for image encryption, as well as for retrieving original images after decryption. In addition, the robustness of the method under attacks using slightly modified keys for the decryption process is also analyzed. Afterward, in Sec. 3.2, we prove the superior performance of the TRPE method under several attacks, when compared with the classical DRPE scheme.
Triple Random-Phase Encoding EncryptionDecryption Testing
Original images in Fig. 3 were encrypted using the TRPE method, and the corresponding results are shown in Figs. 3(b) and 3(f), for the Lena image [ Fig. 3(a) ] and the binary text (BT) image [ Fig. 3(e) ], respectively. Afterward, the decryption process explained in Sec. 2 [Eq. (3)] is applied on the encrypted images. To test the influence of the security keys on the decrypted images, the corresponding decrypted images are calculated under two different scenarios: (case A) on the basis of the exact masks k 1 ; k 2 , and k 3 , so the correct keys are used; and (case B) using incorrect keys, i.e., keys resulting from applying some modification on the original keys.
In particular, we generated random tree masks k 1 , k 2 , and k 3 [see Figs. 4(a)-4(c) ], which were used for the encryption process. When using these exact three masks for decryption, we use the correct keys (case A). Then, we generated a fourth random mask, k 4 [ Fig. 4(d) ]. To perform the incorrect keys case (case B), we use the k 4 phase mask instead of the k 3 mask. Thus, the incorrect key case is performed using the k 1 ; k 2 , and k 4 phase-masks for the decryption process.
The decrypted images obtained using the incorrect keys (case B) are shown in Figs. 3(c) and 3(g), for the Lena image and for the binary image, respectively. By contrast, decrypted images obtained using the correct keys (case A) are shown in Figs. 3(d) and 3(h) , respectively.
To evaluate the quality of the decrypted images, we use the mean-square error (MSE) and the peak-signal-to noise (PSNR) metrics, which are calculated as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 4 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 1 8
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 5 ; 3 2 6 ; 3 6 8 PSNR ¼ 10 log 10 255 2 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi MSE p ;
where fðx; yÞ and f 0 ðx; yÞ denote the original image and the decrypted image, respectively.
Using the decrypted images obtained from the correct keys (case A), the calculated MSE and PSNR values between the original Lena image [ Fig. 3(a) ] and the decrypted image [ Fig. 3(d) and the decrypted images. In addition, obtained MSE and PSNR results are in the order of those obtained using the standard DRPE, this providing the equivalence of the two methods when using correct keys.
Triple Random-Phase Encoding Cryptanalysis
To highlight the interest of using the TRPE method over the classical DRPE scheme, we tested the resistance of the proposed TRPE scheme against three different types of attacks: CPA, KPA, and CCA. Those mentioned attacks have already been used to break the DRPE encryption system in the Fourier domain. A comparison of the security results obtained under the aforementioned attacks for the two considered schemes (DRPE and the proposed TRPE) is also presented.
Triple random-phase encoding method resistance to chosen-plaintext attacks
In CPA, the attackers have the capability to choose arbitrary designed input plaintext to determine the secret keys. To perform the aforementioned comparison between methods, we assume that the attackers choose a Dirac delta function δðx; yÞ as a plaintext to be encrypted, as this approach has already proved the vulnerability of the DRPE scheme in Fourier and Fresnel domains. 26, 27, 32, 33 The Dirac delta function can be written as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 6 ; 6 3 ; 2 1 7 δðx; yÞ ¼ 1;
Thus, the Dirac delta function is displayed as an image with only one nonzero value located at the center and all the other values being equal to 0. For a resolution of 256 × 256 pixels, this function is shown in Fig. 5(a) . For the sake of clarity, a three-dimensional representation of the Dirac delta function is also provided at the bottom of Fig. 5(a) .
Let us start the security analysis by analyzing the DRPE scheme. When the input image of the classical DRPE scheme is replaced with the Dirac delta function {i.e., [fðx; yÞ ¼ δðx; yÞ]}, Eq. (1) becomes E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 7 ; 3 2 6 ; 3 6 5 e DRPE ðx; yÞj CPA ¼ fδðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞg ⊗ hðx; yÞ ¼ hðx; yÞ;
and thus, the obtained encrypted image e DRPE ðx; yÞj CPA is equivalent to the hðx; yÞ function, from which the phase mask k 2 ðu; vÞ could be retrieved by applying the IFT of the hðx; yÞ function. Note that if the object function fðx; yÞ is a real function, it is not necessary to know the phase mask k 1 for the decryption process. Consequently, the attackers can retrieve the secret keys, and then reveal the input image. The aforementioned situation was analyzed in more detail for the Lena image case. To this aim, we used the DRPE method and the particular k 1 and k 2 keys stated in Sec. 3.1 [see Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) ]. The following procedure was followed: first, using fðx; yÞ ¼ δðx; yÞ in Eq. (1), the encrypted image in Fig. 5(b) was obtained. Second, we applied the FT on Eq. (1), this leading to E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 8 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 7 3 FTfe DRPE ðx; yÞg ¼ FTffðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞg × FTfhðx; yÞg:
By replacing Eqs. (7) into (8) and rearranging, we obtain E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 9 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 1 6 fðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞ ¼ IFT FT½e DRPE ðx; yÞ FT½e DRPE ðx; yÞj CPA : Afterward, we used the encrypted Lena image e DRPE ðx; yÞ (calculated by applying the DRPE method) in the numerator of Eq. (9) and the encrypted image e DRPE ðx; yÞj CPA [obtained using the Dirac delta function as an input function with the DRPE scheme as shown in Fig. 5(b) ] in the denominator of Eq. (9) . By doing this, and by applying the modulus of the obtained result, we finally recovered the information of the input image as shown in Fig. 5(c) . Therefore, using the Dirac delta function as a chosen-plaintext image in the DRPE method, any encrypted input image can be retrieved.
For comparison, we repeated the same study but now for the proposed TRPE scheme. Note that when the input image is replaced by the Dirac delta function in Eq. (2) (TRPE case), this equation is rewritten as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 0 ; 6 3 ; 3 3 9 e TRPE ðx; yÞj CPA ¼ ðfδðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 1 ðx; yÞg ⊗ hðx; yÞÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 3 ðx; yÞ ¼ hðx; yÞ × exp½i2πϕ k 3 ðx; yÞ: (10) Note that according to the Eq. (10) we will be unable to directly retrieve any information of the used keys, as in the DRPE case given by Eq. (7) . Thus, the relevant key information is still encrypted and an external CPA based on the Dirac delta function does not retrieve the keys distributions.
We analyzed this statement using again the Lena image as a particular case. To this aim, we used the exact phase masks k 2 and k 3 provided in Sec. 3.1 [see Figs. 4(b) and 4(c)] into the TRPE encryption process given in Eq. (10) . By doing this, the Dirac delta function encrypted image e TRPE ðx; yÞj CPA was obtained for the TRPE case, which is shown in Fig. 5(d) . Next, this calculated e TRPE ðx; yÞj CPA image was introduced to the denominator of Eq. (9). By contrast, for the numerator we used the encrypted Lena image e TRPE ðx; yÞ, which was calculated by applying the TRPE method according to Eq. (2) [see Fig. 3(b) ]. Finally, we applied the modulus of the resulting image, this leading to the final decrypted image, which is shown in Fig. 5(e) . We see how the decrypted image presents a noisy appearance when dealing with the TRPE scheme. Therefore, unlike the traditional DRPE method, the TRPE scheme does not allow retrieving any information about the generated security keys using the Dirac delta function as CPA. Consequently, the actual object image cannot be revealed.
The results provided in this subsection invalidate the DRPE method to be used when CPAs are conducted, in particular, when the Dirac delta function is used as CPA. Unlike this, the interest of using the TRPE method was highlighted because we proved its reliability and security under the same attack, showing that no input object information was retrieved.
Triple random-phase encoding method resistance to known-plaintext attacks
In this section, we analyze the strength of TRPE encryption method against KPA. In KPA, the attackers have a priori knowledge of the encryption method as well as a pair of the plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. Gopinathan et al. 28 proposed a KPA scheme, where the key is obtained through a simulated annealing process. Afterward, Peng et al. 29 demonstrated an approach to KPA on DRPE system using phase retrieval algorithm. In our analysis, we perform the KPA with an iterative process that is based on the Gerchberg-Saxton algorithm 47 to have the access to the phase key k 1 ðx; yÞ in the input plane. Then, we deduce the second key k 2 ðu; vÞ of the frequency plane from the retrieved k 1 ðx; yÞ.
In the case of the DRPE encryption scheme, the second key k 2 ðu; vÞ can be retrieved using the following equation:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 1 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 6 9 k 2 ðu; vÞj DRPE ¼ exp½−i2πϕ k 2 ðu; vÞ ¼ FT½fðx; yÞϕ k 1 ðx; yÞ e DRPE ðu; vÞ :
(11) Figure 6 reveals the simulation results with the use of KPA applied to DRPE encryption system. Figure 6 (a) and 6(b) show the input images used on the simulation. The corresponding encrypted images in the case of DRPE are shown in Figs. 6(c) and 6(e) , respectively. The decrypted images obtained after going through the KPA algorithm are shown in Figs. 6(d) and 6(f), respectively. As it shown, the decrypted images provide enough information to recognize the input images, proving the vulnerability of the DRPE scheme to KPAs.
By contrast, if we try to explore the resistance of the proposed TRPE to KPA using the same aforementioned algorithm [Eq. (11)], and after going through the retrieved random-phase key k 2 , we obtain E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 2 ; 6 3 ; 6 4 2 k 2 ðu; vÞj TRPE ¼ exp½−i2πϕ k 2 ðu; vÞ ¼ FT½fðx; yÞk 1 ðx; yÞ e TRPE ðu; vÞk 3 ðx; yÞ :
We see from Eq. (12) that we are not able to retrieve the key k 2 ðu; vÞ because the key k 3 ðx; yÞ is still unknown. Figure 6 presents the conducted simulation results with the use of KPA algorithm to the proposed TRPE scheme. Figures 6(g) and 6(i) present the encrypted images corresponding to input Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), respectively, in the case of the TRPE scheme. Figures 6(h) and 6(j) show the corresponding decrypted images when using the KPA algorithm. As shown in Figs. 6(h) and 6(j), the decrypted images are very noisy and the attack does not provide any information of the original input images. From these results, we conclude that the TRPE scheme improves the vulnerability of DRPE against KPA.
Triple random-phase encoding method resistance to chosen-ciphertext attacks
The CCA is an attack model for cryptanalysis, where the cryptanalyst can collect information by obtaining the decryptions of chosen ciphertexts. From these pieces of information, the attacker can attempt to recover the hidden secret keys used for decryption. To accomplish this attack, the attacker must be able to enter a one-to-many ciphertexts into the decryption system and then obtain the resulting plaintext. From this information, the secret keys can be recovered for use in the decryption process. We perform the CCA reported by Carnicer et al., 36 where the attacker uses the ciphertext signal defined by the following equation:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 3 ; 3 2 6 ; 6 0 5 e b ðx; yÞ ¼ 1 2 ½expði2πf x 1 xÞ expði2πf y 1 yÞ þ expði2πf x 2 xÞ expði2πf y 2 yÞ:
The FT of e b ðx; yÞ consists of two Dirac delta centered at frequencies ðf x 1 ; f y 1 Þ and ðf x 2 ; f y 2 Þ, respectively, and it is given by E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 4 ; 3 2 6 ; 5 1 8
In the optical decryption system, the captured intensity would have a cosine-type distribution, such as the following one: The value of the phase difference ϕ k 2 ðf x 2 ; f y 2 Þ − ϕ k 2 ðf x 1 ; f y 1 Þ can be computed with respect to a reference, and then the decryption key can be completely recovered. In the case of DRPE, the light distribution at the output is given by E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 6 ; 6 3 ; 6 2 4 f 0 b ðx; yÞj DRPE ¼ FT½e b ðu; vÞk Ã 2 ðu; vÞ:
If we apply the same algorithm described above on the TRPE, the light distribution at the output will be E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 7 ; 6 3 ; According to Eq. (17), the designed ciphertext e b ðx; yÞ is distorted by the random-phase mask k Ã 3 ðx; yÞ and becomes an optical random function. Thus, the attacker cannot collect any useful information by obtaining the decryptions of chosen ciphertexts. As reported by Carnicer et al., 36 ciphertext attack is only efficient for real input signal. Hence, TRPE anticipates any kind of ciphertext attack due to the complex nature of the random-phase mask.
Conclusion
Summarizing, we propose a new method on image encryption, which is based on a TRPE scheme. The TRPE is achieved by extending the well-known DRPE technique by adding an extra randomly generated phase-only mask at the output plane.
The performance of the TRPE method was tested by conducting some numerical simulations. We found that the TRPE scheme leads to a performance equivalent to that of the DRPE method for the encryption-decryption process, in terms of MSE and PSNR metrics. In addition, the TRPE scheme enhances the performance of the DRPE method in terms of security. Such improvement is proved by testing the method against different attacks to which the DRPE method is vulnerable: CPA, KPA, and CCA. The results obtained using the TRPE scheme fulfill the requirements of invisible content, and thus, an illegal user neither can recover the decryption keys nor any plaintext. Therefore, the TRPE scheme proved its resistance to the attack aforementioned in comparison with the DRPE and finds application in security data.
